use Vote::Count::Method::CondorcetIRV ;

  my $Election = Vote::Count::Method::CondorcetIRV->new(
    'BallotSet' => $someballotset,
    'TieBreakMethod' => 'precedence', # defaults to all
  my $result = $Election->SmithSetIRV() ;
  say "Winner is: " . $result->{'winner'};
  say $Election->logv();


Provides Common Basic Condorcet-IRV Methods. These methods are simple and beat other Condorcet Methods on Later Harm.

Method Common Names: Smith Set IRV, Smith-IRV

Identifies the Smith Set and runs IRV on it.

Function Name: SmithSetIRV

SmithSetIRV is exported and requires a Vote::Count object, an optional second argument is an IRV tiebreaker rule name (see IRV module). It will return a hashref similar to RunIRV, in the event of a tie the Vote::Count Object's Active Set will also be the tied choices (available for any later tie breakers you would implement). Events will be logged to the Vote::Count Object.



SmithSet IRV is easy to understand but requires a full matrix and thus is harder to handcount than Benham. If it desired to handcount, an aggressive Floor Rule like TCA (see Floor module) is recommended, or an Approval or Top Count Floor of up to 15%. 15% Top Count permits at most 6 choices, but 6 choices still require 15 pairings to complete the Matrix.

Later Harm

When there is no Condorcet Winner this method is Later Harm Sufficient. There might be edge cases where IRV's sensitivity to dropping order creates a Later Harm effect, but they should be pretty rare. When there is a Condorcet Winner the effect is the normal one for a Condorcet Method.

The easiest way to imagine a case where a choice not in the Smith Set changed the outcome is by cloning the winner, such that there is a choice defeating them in early Top Count but not defeating them. The negative impact of the clone is an established weakness of IRV. It would appear that any possible Later Harm issue in addition to being very much at the edge is more than offset by consistency improvement.

Smith Set IRV still inherits the Later Harm failure of requiring a Condorcet Winner, but it has the lowest possible Later Harm effect for a Smith compliant Method. Woodhull and restricting Pairwise Opposition to the Smith Set have equal Later Harm effect to Smith Set IRV.

Condorcet Criteria

Meets Condorcer Winner, Condorcet Loser, and Smith.


By meeting the three Condorcet Criteria a level of consistency is guaranteed. When there is no Condorcet Winner the resolution has all of the weaknesses of IRV, as discussed in the Later Harm topic above restricting IRV to the Smith Set would appear to provide a consistency gain over basic IRV.

Smith Set IRV is therefore substantially more consistent than basic IRV, but less consistent than Condorcet methods like SSD that focus on Consistency.

Smith Set Restricted MinMax (Currently Unimplemented, See Vote::Count::Method::MinMax)

MinMax methods do not meet the Smith Criteria nor the Condorcet Loser Criteria, two do meet the Condorcet Winner Criteria, and one meets Later Harm. Restricting MinMax to the Smith Set will make all of the sub-methods meet all three Condorcet Criteria; "Opposition" will match the Later Harm protection of Smith Set IRV.

Method Common Name: Woodhull Method (Currently Unimplemented)

The Woodhull method is similar to Smith Set IRV. The difference is: instead of eliminating the choices outside the Smith Set, Woodhull does not permit them to win. Since, it has to deal with the situation where an ineligible choice wins via IRV, it becomes slightly more complex. In addition, group elimination of unwinnable choices slightly improves consistency, which is another advantage to Smith Set IRV. As for possible differences in Later Harm effect, the Later Harm comes from the restriction of the victor to the Smith Set, which is the same effect for both methods.

The argument in favor of Woodhull over Smith would be that: Anything which alters the dropping order can alter the outcome of IRV, and Woodhull preserves the IRV dropping order. Since, a dropping order change has an equal possiblity of helping or hurting one's preferred choice, this side-effect is a random flaw. Removing the least consequential choices is preventing them from impacting the election (in a random manner), thus this author sees it as an advantage for Smith Set IRV.



John Karr (BRAINBUZ)


Copyright 2019-2021 by John Karr (BRAINBUZ)


This module is released under the GNU Public License Version 3. See license file for details. For more information on this license visit


This software is provided as is, per the terms of the GNU Public License. Professional support and customisation services are available from the author.