Crypt::Perl::ECDSA - Elliptic curve cryptography in pure Perl


    my $pub_key1 = Crypt::Perl::ECDSA::Parse::public($pem_or_der);
    my $prv_key1 = Crypt::Perl::ECDSA::Parse::private($pem_or_der);


    my $prkey_by_name = Crypt::Perl::ECDSA::Generate::by_curve_name('secp521r1');

    #Probably only useful for trying out a custom curve?
    my $prkey_by_curve = Crypt::Perl::ECDSA::Generate::by_explicit_curve(
            p => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt
            a => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt
            b => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt
            n => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt

            #Supposedly this can be deduced from the above, but I don’t
            #see the math for this around. It’s not in libtomcryt, AFAICT.
            #It may have to do with Schoof’s Algorithm?
            h => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt

            gx => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt
            gy => ..., #isa Crypt::Perl::BigInt


    my $msg = 'My message';

    my $hash = Digest::SHA::sha256($msg);

    my $sig = $private->sign($hash);

    die 'Wut' if !$private->verify($hash, $sig);

    die 'Wut' if !$public->verify($hash, $sig);


    $key->to_der_with_curve_name( compressed => 1 );
    $key->to_pem_with_curve_name( compressed => 1 );

    $key->to_der_with_explicit_curve( seed => 1 );
    $key->to_der_with_explicit_curve( compressed => 1 );
    $key->to_der_with_explicit_curve( seed => 1, compressed => 1 );
    $key->to_pem_with_explicit_curve( seed => 1 );
    $key->to_pem_with_explicit_curve( compressed => 1 );
    $key->to_pem_with_explicit_curve( seed => 1, compressed => 1 );


See the documentation for Crypt::Perl::ECDSA::PublicKey and Crypt::Perl::ECDSA::PrivateKey for discussions of what these interfaces can do.


The security advantages of elliptic-curve cryptography (ECC) are a matter of some controversy. While the math itself is apparently bulletproof, there are varying opinions about the integrity of the various curves that are recommended for ECC. Some believe that some curves contain backdoors that would allow NIST to sniff a transmission. For more information, look at

That said, RSA will eventually no longer be viable: as RSA keys get bigger, the security advantage of increasing their size diminishes.

Crypt::Perl “has no opinion” regarding which curves you use; it ships all of the prime-field curves that (OpenSSL) includes and works with any of them. You can try out custom curves as well.


Elliptic-curve keys can be in a variety of formats. This library supports almost all of them:

Parse and export of named curves and explicit curves. (See below about explicit curve parameters.)
Parse and export of curve points in compressed or uncompressed form, and parse of points in hybrid form. (NB: RFC 5480 prohibits use of the hybrid form.)

Explicit curves (i.e., giving the curve by full parameters rather than by name reference) may be a known curve or an arbitrary curve. Explicit curves may include or omit the seed value. It is omitted in output by default. Explicit curves may also include or omit the cofactor, but if the curve is unknown the cofactor is required. This is because this library’s export of explicit curves always includes the cofactor. While it’s not required for ECDSA, it’s recommended, and it’s required for ECDH. Moreover, unlike the seed (which nither ECDSA nor ECDH requires), the cofactor is small enough that its inclusion only enlarges the key by a few bytes.

I believe the cofactor can be deduced from the other curve parameters, but I’ve not had time to learn how.

Generator/base points will be exported as compressed or uncompressed according to the public point. If for some reason you really need a compressed base point but an uncompressed public point or vice-versa, and you need this library to do it for you, please explain your need for such a thing in your pull request. :-)


Functionality can be augmented as feature requests come in. Patches are welcome—particularly with tests!

In particular, it would be great to support characteristic-two curves, though almost everything seems to expect the prime-field variety. (OpenSSL is the only implementation I know of that supports characteristic-two.)

It would also be nice to have logic that deduces the cofactor from the other curve parameters.


Most of the ECDSA logic here is ported from Kenji Urushima’s jsrsasign.

Curve data is copied from OpenSSL. (See the script included in the distribution.)

The point decompression logic is ported from LibTomCrypt.